Coordinated Disclosure Timeline
- 2020-11-26: Report sent to maintainer
- 2021-02-23: Issue fixed
Summary
The ant-design/ui.yml, ant-design-pro/preview.yml and pro-components/preview.yml GitHub workflows are vulnerable to arbitrary code execution.
Product
ant-design/ant-design GitHub repository
ant-design/ant-design-pro GitHub repository
ant-design/pro-components GitHub repository
Tested Version
The latest changesets 3f126f1, e451d76 and fb2245e to the date.
Details
Issue: Untrusted code is explicitly checked out and run on a Pull Request from a fork
pull_request_target was introduced to allow triggered workflows to comment on PRs, label them, assign people, etc.. In order to make it possible the triggered action runner has read/write token for the base repository and the access to secrets. In order to prevent untrusted code from execution it runs in a context of the base repository.
By explicitly checking out and running build script from a fork the untrusted code is running in an environment that is able to push to the base repository and to access secrets.
From preview.yml:
on:
pull_request_target:
...
- name: checkout
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_target'
uses: actions/checkout@master
with:
ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/head
...
- name: install
run: npm install
From ui.yml:
on: pull_request_target
...
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
with:
ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
- uses: afc163/surge-preview@v1
with:
surge_token: ${{ secrets.SURGE_TOKEN }}
github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
build: |
npm install
npm install umi-plugin-pro --save
npm run build
...
Impact
The vulnerability allows for unauthorized modification of the base repository and secrets exfiltration.
Credit
This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @JarLob (Jaroslav Lobačevski).
Contact
You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com, please include a reference to GHSL-2020-246 in any communication regarding this issue.